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Background: Social anxiety disorder (SAD) is widely thought to be characterized by heightened behavioral and
limbic reactivity to socio-emotional stimuli. However, although behavioral findings are clear, neural findings are
surprisingly mixed.
Methods: Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we examined behavioral and brain responses in a
priori emotion generative regions of interest (amygdala and insula) in 67 patients with generalized SAD and in 28
healthy controls (HC) during three distinct socio-emotional tasks. We administered these socio-emotional tasks
during one fMRI scanning session: 1) looming harsh faces (Faces); 2) videotaped actors delivering social criticism
(Criticism); and 3) written negative self-beliefs (Beliefs).
Results: In each task, SAD patients reported heightened negative emotion, compared to HC. There were, however,
no SAD versus HC differential brain responses in the amygdala and insula. Between-group whole-brain analyses
confirmed no group differences in the responses of the amygdala and insula, and indicated different brain
networks activated during each of the tasks. In SAD participants, social anxiety symptom severity was associated
with increased BOLD signal in the left insula during the Faces task.
Conclusions: The similar responses in amygdala and insula in SAD and HC participants suggest that heightened
negative emotion responses reported by patients with SAD may be related to dysfunction in higher cognitive
processes (e.g., distorted appraisal, attention biases, or ineffective cognitive reappraisal). In addition, the findings of
this study emphasize the differential effects of socio-emotional experimental tasks.
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Social anxiety disorder (SAD) is defined by a marked
and persistent fear of social or performance situations in
which the person is exposed to unfamiliar people, or
possible scrutiny by others [1]. When interacting with
others, people with SAD experience intense anxiety ac-
companied by physical symptoms such as blushing,
heart racing, sweating, trembling, and nausea, as well as
stuttering and trouble concentrating [2]. SAD is one of
the most common anxiety disorders, with a lifetime
prevalence of up to 13% [3]. When untreated, SAD can* Correspondence: michalz@stanford.edu
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orlead to elevated social isolation, depression, anxiety, and
alcohol and/or substance abuse [4].
Models of SAD have highlighted the role of emotional
hyper-reactivity in feared social situations. Exaggerated
emotional responses are thought to arise from maladap-
tive appraisals of the social situation that transform in-
nocuous social cues into interpersonal threats [5]. This
hyper-reactivity often leads to attempts to escape from
or avoid the anxiety-provoking object or situation [2].
To study the behavioral and brain aspects of this emo-
tional hyper-reactivity, most studies have employed
negatively valenced facial expressions as socio-emotional
probes. Behaviorally, these studies show hyper-arousal
and increased emotional distress in patients with SAD. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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however, the findings are less clear.
The amygdala, which plays a critical role in the recogni-
tion of fear in facial expressions [6], was a natural target in
studies of the neural basis of emotional reactivity in SAD.
It was suggested that the heightened emotional responses
in SAD patients were associated with increased amygdala
activity [7]. Amaral [8] proposed a model based on lesion
studies in monkeys, which suggested that the amygdala
performs a protective function, namely, allowing the or-
ganism to detect and avoid danger. This model provided a
rationale for theories implicating the amygdala in the
neuropathology of SAD.
Many studies have indeed demonstrated heightened
amygdala responses in patients with SAD when viewing
angry, fearful and even neutral facial expressions [7,9-12].
However, other studies, some using stimuli other than
faces, failed to detect differential amygdala activation be-
tween patients with SAD and HC [13-17]. For example,
Quadflieg and colleagues (2008) have found that both
SAD patients and HC recruit the amygdala when listening
to angry compared to neutral prosody [17]. Similarly,
Goldin and colleagues (2009) found increased amygdala
responses to harsh facial expressions with longer stimulus
presentation times (6 seconds) in both SAD patients and
healthy controls [16]. Other studies have even found
decreased amygdala responses in SAD patients compared
to HC. For example, Kilts and colleagues (2006) have
found decreased amygdala responses during both script-
driven imagery of anxiety-provoking social situations and
a mental arithmetic task in SAD [14].
A second limbic region that is thought to play a prom-
inent role in SAD neuropathology is the insula. The in-
sula is interconnected with the amygdala, thalamus, and
orbitofrontal cortex [18], regulates the autonomic ner-
vous system [19], and is involved in the recognition and
experience of aversive states [20] and threat processing
[21]. Thus, hyper-reactivity of the insula in SAD patients
might be responsible for the generation of fear responses
to social aversive stimuli.
A recent meta-analysis identified four functionally dis-
tinct sub-regions in the human insula implicated in social-
emotional, sensorimotor, olfacto-gustatory, and cognitive
brain networks [22]. The ventral part of the insula was
associated with the social-emotional domain. This ventral
region was active in 195 experiments of emotion gener-
ation (paradigms of “induction, imagination or recall of
own happiness, fear, anxiety, anger, sadness, or disgust”)
and 120 empathy related experiments (paradigms of judg-
ing emotions in faces or attending to pain in others). This
differentiation matches previous cytoarchitectonic studies
in non-human primates that found differences between
the anterior-basal agranular, allocortical, and posterior
granular parts of the insula [23]. The anterior-ventralregion is involved in the generation and mediation of
feeling as a response to environmental stimuli and
affective states [24], and in the recognition of emotions
in faces [25]. In SAD, increased activity in this insula
region was associated with visualization of angry and
disgusted faces [13,26], viewing of images with nega-
tive emotional content [27], and anticipation of a pub-
lic speaking task [28]. However, several studies did not
find such activity differences [17,29] and others found
decreased activity in the insula during a public speaking
task [30] and during an implicit learning test [31].
Thus, despite the clear focus of neuroimaging studies
on the amygdala and insula as key regions in SAD path-
ology, findings are mixed. One explanation for these
mixed findings might be related to factors such as differ-
ent stimuli and experimental designs used to elicit emo-
tional responses (mainly emotional faces until a few
years ago, and images, written words, and auditory stimuli
more recently), small patients groups, differences in exclu-
sion criteria (e.g., different psychiatric co-morbidity), and
other experimental parameters.
However, another explanation could be a lack of concord-
ance between the behavioral and physiological components
of anxiety. This idea was raised by Mauss and colleagues in
a study of non-clinical social anxiety [32]. In this study, anx-
iety experience, subjectively perceived physiological activa-
tion, and objectively measured physiological activation were
assessed in high and low trait social anxiety participants
using an impromptu speech paradigm. The study found
no differences in physiological responding between high
and low trait social anxiety, despite clear differences be-
tween the two groups in their subjective experience of
anxiety and their perceived physiological activation. Al-
though this study did not measure brain responses, and
did not employ a clinical sample, it did raise an important
question about the widely assumed link between behav-
ioral and physiological responses in the context of social
anxiety.
In light of the mixed literature on the neural correlates
of emotion reactivity in SAD, the goal of the present
study was to examine both behavioral responses and
BOLD signal changes in SAD compared to HC when
reacting to distinct types of socio-emotional stimuli. To
test whether behavior and brain responses vary by con-
text, we used three different socio-emotional tasks: 1)
viewing looming harsh faces (Faces), 2) watching dy-
namic videos of actors delivering social criticism (Criti-
cism), and 3) reading negative self-beliefs (Beliefs).
These tasks mirror the specific types of interpersonal
evaluations and negative thoughts that are especially sa-
lient in patients with SAD. As suggested by the litera-
ture, we focused on the amygdala and the insula regions,
but also performed whole-brain analyses to examine the
involvement of other brain networks in SAD.
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SAD would have (1) greater self-reported negative emo-
tion reactivity for each of the three tasks; and (2) greater
BOLD responses in the amygdala and insula. In second-
ary analyses, we examined the differential effect of each
socio-emotional task on negative emotion reactivity and
neural responses in SAD and HC, and whether – among
SAD participants – negative emotion reactivity and
neural responses were associated with social anxiety
symptom severity.Methods
Participants
Participants included 67 (32 females) adults who met
DSM-IV-TR [1] criteria for primary generalized SAD and
28 (13 females) healthy controls (HC) with no lifetime
history of psychiatric disorders (Table 1). Patients were
recruited through clinician referrals and advertisements
on community and online bulletin boards. Two PhD-
level clinical psychologists assessed each potential par-
ticipant using the Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule
for DSM-IV-TR Lifetime version (ADIS-IV-L) [33]. We
invited into the study only patients who met clinical
diagnostic criteria for a principal diagnosis of current
generalized SAD (defined as greater than moderate anx-
iety/fear for 5 or more distinct social situations) or
healthy controls (with no current or past history of
DSM-IV disorders).
Both SAD and HC had a mean age of 33 years (range:
SAD 21–53 years; HC 21–52 years, see Table 1) andTable 1 Demographic and clinical variables
SAD n=67 HC n= 28 t-value Partial eta2
Females (n) 32 13
Age (Mean
years ± SD)
33.0 ± 8.8 32.6 ± 9.5 0.2
Education (Mean
years ± SD)
16.7 ± 2.4 17.5 ± 1.5 1.6
EDI
(Mean ± SD)
9.9 ± 0.3 9.8 ± 0.4 0.30
Ethnicity
- Caucasian 38 17
- Asian 17 8







- Filipino 1 0
LSAS-SR
(Mean ± SD)
84.1 ± 17.5 15.3 ± 9.1 19.3 * .85
Note: EDI = Edinburgh Handedness Inventory, LSAS-SR = Liebowitz Social
Anxiety Scale–Self-Report.
* P < .0001.were right-handed as assessed by the Edinburgh Hand-
edness Inventory [34]. Potential patients were excluded
if they reported current pharmacotherapy or psychother-
apy, history of neurological disorders, and current psy-
chiatric disorders (other than SAD, generalized anxiety
disorder, agoraphobia without a history of panic attacks,
dysthymia, or specific phobia). HC were not permitted
to meet criteria for any current or past psychiatric
disorders.
Among patients, current Axis-I co-morbidity included
3 with panic attacks, 13 with generalized anxiety dis-
order, 3 with dysthymia and 5 with specific phobia. Past
Axis-I co-morbidity included 13 with major depression,
4 with substance abuse, 1 with panic attacks, 1 with dys-
thymia, and 1 with eating disorder. Thirty-three patients
reported past (i.e., ended more than 1 year ago) non-
cognitive-behavioral psychotherapy, and 20 reported past
pharmacotherapy. All participants provided informed con-
sent in accordance with Stanford University Human
Subjects Committee rules.
Clinical assessment
To asses social anxiety symptom severity, participants
completed the Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale-Self-Report
(LSAS-SR) [35]. This questionnaire assesses both fear and
behavioral avoidance of social situations, and is widely
used in the research of SAD [36].
Experimental tasks
Prior to scanning, patients were trained on the three
socio-emotional tasks programmed in Eprime (Psych-
ology Software Tools, Inc). The stimuli used in the pre-
fMRI training were not the same stimuli used in the MR
scanner. All three tasks were composed of “React”,
“Asterisks” and “Reframe” conditions. In the present
study, we report on data from the React condition,
contrasting it with the Asterisks condition. The results
for the Reframe condition will be published elsewhere.
During the “React” condition, participants were instructed
to react normally without any attempt to control, mod-
ify, or regulate any reactions. After each React condi-
tion, participants provided a negative emotion rating
using a button response pad positioned in the
participant’s right hand inside the magnet by responding to
“How negative do you feel?” (1 = not at all to 5 = very much).
The Asterisks condition served as a low-level compari-
son condition, during which one to five white asterisks
were displayed over a black background. Participants
were asked to count how many asterisks were on the
screen during the Faces and Criticism tasks, and were
not given any counting instructions during the Beliefs
task. There were 13 trials for this condition in the Faces
task, 18 trials in the Criticism task, and 7 trials in the
Beliefs task.
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The task consisted of 24 trials during which the partici-
pant viewed color photos of Ekman’s facial action coded
[37] faces displaying anger and contempt. The length of
the entire task was 516 TRs, which is 12 minutes and 54
sec (774 sec). Each trial consisted of a cue to look (1.5
sec), a single harsh facial stimulus (9 sec) presented in
color and appearing to move closer to the participant
every 3 sec to simulate looming, and a negative emotion
rating after the face stimulus terminated (3 sec)
(Figure 1a). Participants were trained prior to the base-
line scan to react to the faces by engaging in the pictureFigure 1 The three socio-emotional tasks. (a) Harsh looming
faces (Faces); (b) social criticism (Criticism); (c) negative self-beliefs
(Beliefs). For each task, a “React” trial consisted of: 1) a 1.5 seconds
“Cue”; 2) a socio-emotional stimulus (a harsh looming face/ a video-
clip of an actor delivering social criticism/ an autobiographical
sentence + NSB); and 3) a negative emotion rating scale. Participants
were instructed to react normally to the stimuli without any attempt
to control, modify or regulate their reactions.(“Just let yourself feel”) and thinking: "This person is
upset with me; angry with me”.Dynamic social criticism (Criticism task)
The task consisted of videotaped actors delivering social
criticism and social praise and harsh or happy evaluation-
congruent facial expressions (Figure 1b). The stimuli were
delivered by five male and five female actors (seven
Anglo-Americans and three Asian-Americans) with an
age range of 23–50. Each condition consisted of 16 trials
delivered across two runs of 342 TRs, 8 min 35 sec each
(513 sec). Each 13.5 sec trial consisted of a cue to “Just
Watch” (1.5 sec), followed by a video clip of an actor
delivering social evaluation (12 sec). Each 12 sec video clip
had a 4.5 sec waiting period during which the actor si-
lently maintained a neutral facial expression followed by a
7.5 sec evaluation period in which the actor delivered a so-
cial criticism or praise statement while displaying a harsh
or positive facial expression. For the current study, only
social criticism trials were included in the analysis (see
examples in Table 2). After each video clip, participants
were cued to rate their current negative emotion (3 sec).
Participants were trained prior to scanning to react to the
social criticism by reflecting on how the statement
represents something true about themselves.Negative self-beliefs (Beliefs task)
This task consisted of five situations. The first was an
experimenter-composed neutral situation about cleaning a
car that was used to obtain baseline emotion ratings for
reading neutral statements. Then, four participant-generated
autobiographical social anxiety situations characterized byTable 2 Examples of social criticism and negative
self-beliefs
Social criticism statements Negative self beliefs
You don't seem very smart I ALWAYS MESS UP
You've lost my interest OTHERS SEE MY FAULTS
I feel uncomfortable being
with you
I FELT HUMILIATED
You would not make a good
leader
OTHERS THINK I'M A FOOL
You don't seem courageous I AM INCOMPETENT
You're a boring person OTHERS DO NOT LIKE ME





OTHERS THINK I AM NOT NORMAL
Everyone thinks you are so
weird
I AM STUPID
You never know what to say OTHERS KNOW SOMETHING IS WRONG
WITH ME
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presented. Three situations were presented in a first
run lasting 374 TRs, 9 min 21 sec (561 sec), followed
by two situations in a second run of 256 TRs, 6 min 24 sec
(534 sec). For each situation, participants composed a sin-
gle paragraph describing the events, thoughts, and feelings
and provided situation specific negative self-beliefs (NSBs,
see examples in Table 2).
Each situation consisted of an instruction to React
(1.5 sec), 16 sentences in white font against a black
background describing the situation (3 sec each), 10
NSBs (9 sec each) embedded in the unfolding story in
uppercase letters that flashed 9 times (850 msec on + 150
msec off), and a negative emotion rating after each NSB
(3 sec) (Figure 1c). Negative self-beliefs were flashed to
maintain attention. Participants were trained prior to
scanning to react to NSBs by reflecting on how the NSB
represents something that is true about themselves.
Image acquisition
Imaging was performed on a General Electric 3-T Signa
magnet with a T2*-weighted gradient echo spiral-in/out
pulse sequence [38] and a custom-built quadrature
“dome” elliptical bird cage head-coil (GE Healthcare,
Milwaukee, Wisconsin). Head movement was minimized
using a bite-bar and foam padding. Functional volumes
(516 for faces, 684 for criticism, 630 for belief tasks)
were obtained from 22 sequential axial slices (repetition
time = 1500 milliseconds, echo time = 30 milliseconds,
flip angle = 60°, field of view = 22 cm, matrix = 64x64,
single-shot, resolution = 3.438 mm2 x 4.5 mm). Three-
dimensional high-resolution anatomical scans were
acquired using a fast spin-echo spoiled gradient recall
(resolution = .8594 mm2 x 1.5 mm; field of view = 22 cm,
frequency encoding = 256).
fMRI data pre-processing
Analysis of Functional Neuroimages (AFNI) software
[39] was used for preprocessing and statistical analysis.
Each functional run was subjected to preprocessing steps
to maximize signal-to-noise contrast. This included an
analysis of potential outliers, volume registration to a
base image, motion correction, 4 mm3 isotropic Gaussian
spatial smoothing, high-pass filtering (.011 Hz), linear
detrending, and conversion into BOLD signal per-
centage change in each voxel. In addition, to allow for
T2* equilibration effects, the first four images of each
functional run were excluded. For the Criticism and
Beliefs tasks, the two functional runs were concatenated
prior to statistical analysis. No volumes demonstrated
motion in the x, y, or z directions in excess of ±1 mm.
There was no evidence of stimulus-correlated motion, as
assessed by correlations between condition specific reference
functions and x, y, z motion correction parameters.fMRI statistical analysis
Multiple-regression implemented with AFNI 3dDeconvolve
included baseline parameters to remove mean, linear, and
quadratic trends, and motion-related variance in the BOLD
signal. For each task, the React condition was defined as:
for Faces, the 9 sec single face stimulus; for Criticism, the
7.5 sec. evaluation period; and for the beliefs the 9 sec. of
NSBs (see bold lines in Figures 1a,b,c). Regressors for the
Asterisks and React conditions were convolved with the
Cohen’s gamma variate model of the hemodynamic re-
sponse function [40]. Functional MRI BOLD signal inten-
sity was computed as percentage of signal change, an effect
size measure [(MR signal per voxel per time point / mean
MR signal in that voxel for the entire functional run)
x 100].
Individual brain maps were converted to Talairach
atlas space [41] and second-level group statistical para-
metric maps were produced according to a random-
effects model. To correct for multiple comparisons,
AlphaSim, a Monte Carlo simulation bootstrapping pro-
gram in the AFNI library, was used to protect against
false positives [42]. This method uses a voxel-wise and
cluster volume joint-probability threshold to establish a
cluster-wise false positive cluster detection level. The
cluster statistical threshold for the between group ana-
lyses consisted of a voxel-wise P < .005 and cluster vol-
ume higher than 162 mm3 (4 voxels x 3.438 mm3) to
protect against false-positive cluster detection at P < .01.
Regions of interest analyses
To examine emotion reactivity related brain responses,
we used the left and right amygdala, and left and right
insula as a priori regions of interest (ROIs) (Figure 2).
The amygdala was anatomically defined using the AFNI
Talairach Daemon. The insula ROI was defined as the
social-emotional sub-region identified in a meta-analysis
by Kurth et al. ([22], see Additional file 1: Table S1 for
peak xyz Talairach coordinates). We created spherical
masks (radius = 7 mm, volume = 1,437 mm3) centered
on the peak xyz Talairach coordinates in left and right
insula regions, separately. The volume of each ROI was:
left amygdala: 81 voxels = 3,292 mm3, right amygdala: 81
voxels = 3,292 mm3, left insula: 237 voxels = 9,631 mm3,
right insula: 244 voxels = 9,915 mm. We examined BOLD
responses within these ROIs with a SAD versus HC
between-group ANOVA of React versus Asterisks. The
mean and standard deviations per ROI, per group, per
task, were calculated. We removed outliers defined as
greater than 3 standard deviations from the mean per
ROI per group per task.
To examine the relationship between social anxiety
symptom severity and brain responses in SAD patients,
we computed Pearson correlation coefficients using SPSS.
To correct for Type 1 error, the statistical threshold was
Figure 2 The a priori regions of interest. a: Left and right amygdala. b: Left and right insula.
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that were tested (symptom severity and brain responses
during Faces, symptom severity and brain responses during
Criticism, and symptom severity and brain responses
during Beliefs).Whole-brain analyses
For whole-brain analyses, we identified a sub-group of
the 27 SAD patients with the highest social anxiety
symptom severity (LSAS-SR scores between 85–102)
and compared them to the 27 HC using a between-
group ANOVA of React versus Asterisk. We selected the
SAD participants with the highest levels of symptom se-
verity to provide the most sensitive test possible of our




Negative emotion ratings A between-group t-test revealed
greater negative emotion ratings for SAD (n = 63, mean =
2.94, SD= 0.69) than HC (n = 28, mean = 2.11, SD= 0.82;
t89 = 4.98, P < .0001) when reacting to harsh faces (Figure 3a).Brain responses For react faces versus asterisks counting,
between-group t-tests of BOLD responses showed no
differences between SAD and HC in left and right amyg-
dala (all Ps > .74), and in the left and right insula (all
Ps > .07, Figure 3b). In supplementary analyses, between-
group whole brain t-tests showed that, compared to HC,
patients had greater BOLD responses in the medial frontal
gyrus, left middle frontal gyrus, superior frontal gyrus,
right superior temporal gyrus, and left middle temporal
gyrus/inferior frontal gyrus (Table 3).
Criticism
Negative emotion ratings A between-group t-test revealed
greater negative emotion ratings for SAD (n = 66, mean =
3.15, SD= 0.81) than HC (n = 28, mean = 2.16, SD= 0.73;
t92 = 5.57, P < .0001) when reacting to criticism (Figure 4a).
Brain responses There were no differences between SAD
and HC in left and right amygdala (all Ps > .28), and left
and right insula (all Ps > .40, Figure 4b). A between-group
whole-brain t-test for react to criticism versus asterisks
counting showed that, compared to HC, patients had
greater BOLD responses in the left lingual gyrus, bilateral
middle temporal gyrus, and the right parahippocampal
gyrus (Table 3).
Figure 3 Faces task. Between groups differences in negative emotion ratings (a) and in % BOLD signal changes in the left and right amygdala
and left and right insula (b).
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Negative emotion ratings A between-group t-test revealed
greater negative emotion ratings for SAD (n = 65, mean =
3.70, SD= 0.60) than HC (n = 25, mean = 2.69, SD= 1.04;
t88 = 5.76, P < .0001) when reacting to negative self-beliefs
(Figure 5a).
Brain responses There were no differences between SAD
and HC in left and right amygdala (all Ps > .12), and left
and right insula (all Ps > .69, Figure 5b). A between-group
whole-brain t-test showed that, compared to HC, patients
had lesser BOLD responses in the right middle frontal
gyrus and left superior frontal gyrus when reacting to
beliefs versus asterisks (Table 3).
Secondary analyses
Negative emotion ratings
Between-group differences A 2 Group (SAD, HC) x 3
Task (Faces, Criticism, Beliefs) repeated-measures ANOVA
of negative emotion ratings yielded main effects of group
(SAD>HC, F1,85 = 35.34, P < .0001, partial eta
2 (ηp
2) = .29)
and task (F2,170 = 42.80, P < .0001, ηp
2 = .34, Belief >
Criticism > Faces for SAD; Belief > Criticism = Faces for
HC), with no group by task interaction (Figure 6).Association with social anxiety symptoms In patients
with SAD, no correlation was found between social anx-
iety symptom severity (LSAS-SR) and negative emotion
ratings when reacting to faces (P > .08), criticism (P > .05),
and beliefs (P > .54).
Brain responses
Between group differences To examine the differential
responses to each of the tasks in SAD and HC, we
conducted a 2 Group (SAD, HC) x 3 Task (Faces, Criticism,
Beliefs) repeated-measures ANOVA of BOLD responses in
the left and right amygdala and insula.
Amygdala For the left amygdala, there were no main
effects of task or group, and no group by task interaction
(all Ps > .05) (Figure 7a). For the right amygdala, there
was a main effect of task (F2,154 = 4.61, P < .011, ηp
2 = .06),
and no main effect of group or group by task interaction
(all Ps > .28). Follow-up paired-samples t-tests indicated
that in SAD, there were greater BOLD responses when
reacting to criticism, and when reacting to faces,
compared to beliefs, with no significant difference be-
tween criticism and faces (Criticism = Faces > Beliefs, all
Ps < .0001). In HC, no significant differences were found
Table 3 Between-group differential BOLD responses for
React versus Asterisks in 27 patients with SAD versus
27 HC
Brain regions x y z Vol (mm3) t-value
Faces
SAD > HC
Medial Frontal Gyrus 0, 62, 8 2235 4.4
Superior Medial Frontal Gyrus 0, 52, 36 447 3.2
Left Medial Frontal Gyrus −7, 59, -2 244 3.33
−14, 52, 1 203 3.21
Left Middle Frontal Gyrus −28, 52, 5 162 3.12
−28, 49, 12 284 3.11
Left Middle Temporal Gyrus −52, 14, -12 325 3.6
Right Superior Temporal Gyrus 52, -61, 19 406 3.03
Criticism
SAD > HC
Left Lingual Gyrus −24, -75, -9 244 3.13
−17, -82, 5 162 2.96
Left Middle Temporal Gyrus −52, 0, -16 203 3.45
Right Middle Temporal Gyrus 48, -10, -16 203 3.71
Right Parahippocampus 14, -10, -16 162 3.23
Beliefs
SAD > HC - none
HC > SAD
Right Middle Frontal Gyrus 52, 38, 36 244 3.19
Left Superior Temporal Gyrus −69, -27, 12 162 3.46
Note. t-value threshold ≥ 2.932, voxel P < 0.005, minimum cluster volume
threshold ≥162 mm3 (4 voxels x 3.438 mm3), cluster P < 0.01.
BA = Brodmann area, xyz = Talairach and Tournoux coordinates of maximum
BOLD signal intensity voxel.
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Faces = Belief, all Ps > .21) (Figure 7b).Insula For the left insula, there was a main effect of task
(F2,172 = 76.51, P < .0001, ηp
2 = .47), and no main effect of
group or group by task interaction (all Ps > .28). Follow-up
paired-samples t-tests indicated greater BOLD responses
when reacting to criticism, compared to beliefs, and a sig-
nificant difference between beliefs and faces, in both
patients and HC (Criticism > Beliefs > Faces, all Ps < .0001)
(Figure 8a).
For the right insula, there was a main effect of task
(F2,174 = 122.31, P < .0001, ηp
2 = .58), and a group by task
interaction (F2,174 = 3.97, P < .021, ηp
2 = .04), with no
main effect of group (P > .41). Follow-up paired samples
t-tests indicated greater BOLD responses when reacting
to criticism, compared to beliefs, and a significant differ-
ence between beliefs and faces, in both SAD and HC
(Criticism > Belief > Faces, all Ps < .0001) (Figure 8b).Association with social anxiety symptoms In patients
with SAD, there was an association of social anxiety
symptom severity and BOLD responses in the left insula
during the Faces task (r = .40, P = .001; Figure 9).Discussion
The goal of the present study was to investigate behav-
ioral and brain responses in patients with SAD versus
HC when reacting to three socio-emotional tasks (faces,
criticism, beliefs). As we expected, at the behavioral level
all three tasks induced heightened negative reactivity in
SAD versus HC participants. However, we found no evi-
dence of between-group differences in amygdala and in-
sula BOLD responses. Both SAD and HC had increased
left and right amygdala responses in all three tasks, and
increased left and right insula responses in 2 of the 3
tasks (Criticism and Beliefs).
How might this discrepancy between our current
results and previous work on emotion-related brain
responses in SAD be explained? One possibility is that
differences in the experimental tasks used played a cru-
cial role [43]. To date, most studies have used static fa-
cial expression stimuli to examine neural processing of
interpersonal threat cues. Studies that have investigated
social stimuli other than faces have yielded mixed results
[16,17,44,45]. For example, no differential recruitment of
the amygdala and insula in SAD and HC were found
when listening to angry versus neutral voices [17], when
performing a social situation task [44], or when playing
a ‘decision making’ game with others [45].
In our study, we used three distinct types of socio-
emotional tasks with relatively high levels of complexity.
The Faces task used a static emotional facial expression
with the addition of looming (i.e., the appearance of
approaching the perceiver). The Criticism task used dy-
namic videos of an actor delivering socially critical
comments. The Beliefs task used participant-generated
negative self-beliefs embedded in an autobiographical
script about a socially painful interpersonal situation. In
addition, all three tasks paradigms had longer stimulus
presentation durations (9–12 sec) than have been used
in most prior studies.
It is possible that the increased stimulus complexity and
presentation durations in our study increased the likeli-
hood that healthy subjects would evaluate the stimuli as
threatening, and thus may have yielded emotion reactivity
related brain responses similar to those generated by the
patients with SAD. In addition to the stimuli used to elicit
emotional responses, other design parameters such as
whether the participants are instructed to simply look at
the stimuli, or whether they have to perform a task,
and whether the task is implicit or explicit, may have
contributed to the observed findings [46].
Figure 4 Criticism task. Between groups differences in negative emotion ratings (a) and in % BOLD signal changes in the left and right
amygdala and left and right insula (b).
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upon the first, and suggests that at least in the complex
socio-emotional contexts we employed in our study (and
which characterize many everyday life contexts), increased
negative emotion ratings in SAD may be related to
exaggerated cognitive biases, including negative self-
reflective and ruminative processes. It is also possible that
there are differential tendencies to implement spontan-
eous (uninstructed) emotion regulation directed at the
emotion experience in HC versus SAD patients. This
could have yielded lower levels of negative emotion ratings
in HC. Thus, if the normative pattern shown in HC is to
engage in automatic emotion regulation, then one feature
of SAD is the absence of such un-cued, automatic acti-
vation of emotion regulation. Therefore, maladaptive
cognitive processes, such as rumination, suppression,
and self-criticism, and ineffective emotion regulation,
in SAD may lead to exaggerated negative emotion
experience.
If such accounts are correct, we might expect other
brain regions (in addition to amygdala and insula) to show
differential response patterns between SAD and HC when
exposed to socio-emotional stimuli. Indeed, whole brain
analyses revealed SAD versus HC differences in several
brain regions, specifically, increased frontal, occipital, andtemporal cortical activity in SAD versus HC during the
Faces and Criticism tasks, and decreased frontal activity in
SAD versus HC during the Beliefs task (Table 3). These
regions have been shown to be involved in emotion
regulation (middle frontal gyrus) [47], recognition of
faces (middle temporal gyrus) [48], language processing
(superior temporal gyrus), memory (lingual gyrus,
parahippocampus), and social cognition (medial frontal
gyrus, superior temporal gyrus) [49]. In SAD, though
not much discussed, abnormal activity in these regions
has been related to difficulties in reasoning [28],
mentalizing abilities [45], and impaired perception of
self and others [50-52]. Additionally, the whole brain
analyses further support our findings of no between-
group differences in amygdala and insula activity when
reacting to the socio-emotional tasks.
Congruent with these findings, in a recent study,
Doehrmann and colleagues (2012) examined the associ-
ation between responses to cognitive-behavioral therapy
for SAD and pre-treatment brain activations to social (fa-
cial) and nonsocial (scene) stimuli [53]. They found pre-
treatment activity in visual cortical regions correlated with
treatment outcome, and no association with treatment
outcome in the amygdala, despite its robust activation to
all experimental conditions. The authors explained these
Figure 5 Beliefs task. Between groups differences in negative emotion ratings (a) and in % BOLD signal changes in the left and right amygdala
and left and right insula (b).
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and specifically attentional deployment, in SAD. They
suggested that CBT is perhaps particularly successful in
patients with better emotion regulation capacities, which
is correlated with already stronger responses to angry
faces in visual regions. Thus, in addition to showing noFigure 6 Task effects within each group - negative emotion
ratings. For SAD, ratings were the highest for Beliefs, and lowest for
the Faces task (Beliefs > Criticism > Faces). For HC, ratings were the
highest for Beliefs, with no difference between Criticism and
Faces (Beliefs > Criticism = Faces).abnormality in baseline amygdala response in SAD, this
study suggests that brain regions more related to emotion
regulation and not to emotion reactivity, might be the
core deficit in SAD, and the focus of change during
treatment.
More generally, our finding of increased negativity in
SAD compared to HC when facing emotional stimuli,
with no such SAD versus HC differences in the amyg-
dala and insula responses, could suggest that self-report
of negative emotion is less tightly coupled with increased
limbic activity than is typically thought, at least in the
context of social anxiety. This hypothesis accords with
the findings of Mauss and colleagues [32], namely, a
decoupling of subjective emotion and physiological
measures and objective physiological responses in high
and low socially anxious participants when giving an
impromptu speech. The authors suggested that the
findings of increased physiological activation during the
speech in all participants (and not only in participants
who reported increased experience of anxiety) leaves open
the possibility that physiological activation might be ne-
cessary for the experience of anxiety, but such activation
is clearly not sufficient to explain inter-individual variation
in anxiety experience. The results of the current study
strengthen the conclusions of Mauss and her colleagues.
Figure 8 Task effects within each group – insula BOLD
responses. For both left and right insula, there were greater BOLD
responses when reacting to criticism, compared to beliefs, and a
significant difference between beliefs and faces, in SAD and
HC (Criticism > Beliefs > Faces).
Figure 9 Faces - association with social anxiety symptoms.
During the Faces task, social anxiety symptom severity was
associated with BOLD responses in the left insula.
Figure 7 Task effects within each group – amygdala BOLD
Responses. For the left amygdala, there was no main effect of task
in SAD and in HC. For the right amygdala, there were greater BOLD
responses when reacting to criticism, and when reacting to faces,
compared to beliefs (Criticism = Faces > Beliefs) in SAD, and no
significant between tasks differences in HC (Criticism = Faces =
Beliefs).
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and physiological response is more complex than a simple
‘amygdala = emotion’ equation would suggest.
It also bears comment that in the current study, exam-
ination of between task effects enabled us to examine
whether the behavioral and neural results were related
to a particular type of socio-emotional stimuli. Although
all three tasks were successful in terms of inducing
higher emotional responses in SAD, compared to HC, it
seems that no task activated all emotion generation
brain regions consistently. Our results indicate that differ-
ent contexts, i.e. different “anxiety-inducing” experimental
probes may have quite different effects, behaviorally and
neurally. Behaviorally, the Beliefs task yielded the highest
negative emotion reactions in both SAD and HC. Thus,
the idiographic, participant-generated negative self-beliefs
were the most potent emotional probe, most likely be-
cause of their self-relevance or personal salience. These
probes were also the most ecologically valid type of stimuli
in our study, as negative self-focused automatic thoughts
are usually the focus of most forms of psychological
interventions for SAD. Interestingly, the Beliefs task,
which elicited the greatest negative emotion responses,
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right amygdala responses were equally high for Criticism
and Faces, and lower for Beliefs (with no differential task
effects in the left amygdala) in SAD patients. BOLD
responses in the left and right insula were highest when
reacting to Criticism > Beliefs > Faces in both SAD and
HC.
Contrary to our hypothesis, social anxiety symptom
severity was not correlated with negative emotion
ratings, and was associated only with greater left insula
activation during the Faces task, with no association
with amygdala response. This finding accords with the
findings of Schmidt and colleagues [46] of a positive cor-
relation between insula activity and symptom severity in
SAD patients, despite no differential effect in the insula
between SAD and HC, during explicit processing of ver-
bal threat-related stimuli. The association with symptom
severity suggests that within patients with SAD, symp-
tom severity matters. Thus, during the Faces task, even
though as a group SAD patients had insula responses
comparable to the HC group, greater social anxiety
symptom severity within patients was found to be
associated with increased neural responses. A recent
study by Furmark and colleagues further supports the
importance of looking beyond only meeting diagnostic
criteria for SAD. They found that both patients with
SAD and HC had increased left amygdala activation in
response to angry compared with neutral faces, but that
genotype (serotonergic polymorphisms) and not diagno-
sis explained a significant portion of the variance in
amygdala responsiveness [54].
Conclusions
This is the first study to specifically assess three distinct
types of socio-emotional experimental tasks in a large
sample of patients with SAD at a single time point. Our
main finding is similar increased amygdala and insula
responses when reacting to socio-emotional stimuli, des-
pite increased emotional responses in SAD, compared to
HC. The fact that we obtained the same result using
three different tasks provides strong validation of our
findings. To test our hypothesis of deficits in emotion
regulation processes in SAD, future studies should investi-
gate regulation processes, both explicit (when instructed
to regulate) and implicit (spontaneous), in SAD and in
HC. A direct examination of emotion regulation processes
and their association with neural activity in limbic and
cortical brain regions could help in understanding the de-
ficient appraisal processes in SAD.
Methodologically, more studies are needed to further
examine different kinds of tasks/contexts, which might
help to evaluate the influence of different variables, such
as the degree of personal salience, the intensity of the
emotional stimuli, and the modality of the stimuli, onthe behavioral and neural responses. Also, in addition to
examination of negative emotional stimuli, an interesting
venue could be the investigation of positive emotional
stimuli, such as social praise, or positive self-related
thoughts.
In this study, in order to be able to compare between
the different tasks, we contrasted the React condition to
an Asterisks condition. However, in the future, it will be
important to examine the results when contrasting re-
activity to negative stimuli with reactivity to neutral
stimuli as well.
Finally, an interesting question arising from the cur-
rent results is whether other clinical populations such as
major depression, generalized anxiety, or mixed anxiety-
depression, show the same dissociation between height-
ened emotional reactivity and similar limbic responses,
compared to HC. In the future, it will be important to
compare behavioral and BOLD responses during negative
emotional contexts in SAD group versus other clinical
populations, in order to examine the specificity of the
results reported here.
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